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ACCOUNTING FOR IDLE CAPACITY:
ITS PLACE IN THE HISTORICAL COST
LITERATURE AND CONJECTURE ABOUT
ITS DISAPPEARANCE
Abstract: How best to provide management with useful information
about the underutilization of factory and machinery are old cost accounting questions. The literature from the turn of the century up
through the 1950s reveals that the topic interested many. This paper
resurrects those historical discussions. The objective is twofold, to
demonstrate the sophistication and innovation of early writers emphasizing why they thought the topic important, and, to explore some
theories about why this interest dissipated within the accounting
literature. The possibilities include the effect of the great depression,
wartime regulations, the withdrawal of the industrial engineer from
costing and the growing importance of income measurement. This
research ends in the 1960s, by which time idle capacity as an independent topic has largely disappeared.

Accounting for and providing management with information about idle time and idle capacity1 was a subject that occupied cost accountants primarily in the first half of this century.
Garner's (1976) review of the literature from 1900 to 1925
showed that the topic appeared frequently and regularly. The
economist, J.M. Clark, thought understanding and controlling
capacity to be of such importance that he made it the central
theme of his landmark 1923 book, The Economics of Overhead
Costs. While some of Clark's topics, such as his exploration of
differential analysis, remains in modern texts, his particular interest in the isolation and interpretation of idle capacity disappeared. Many authors of cost textbooks before 1950 gave substantial space to the problem of idle capacity, but its coverage
declined and it has only been in recent years that capacity issues
have reappeared in the cost literature.
1

The subject of idle time includes the idle time of labor, the idle time of
specific machines and the idle time of the factory, more commonly called idle
capacity. In the literature and in this paper, the terms are used interchangeably.
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Of the idle time of labor, of machinery and of the factory,
the latter two dominate the literature. Writers in the cost literature from 1900 to 1960 seldom address the topic of idle labor.
Garner's (1976) work shows only the technical, that is, the bookkeeping, aspect of labor accounting. There are no later articles
illustrating how accounting measurements might be used to
provide information for m a n a g e m e n t control purposes (examples of the technical type include: Brown 1927, Peden 1934,
Totten 1941). 2 Managers undoubtedly observed and controlled
labor outside of or tangentially to the accounting system. The
consistency with which the literature treats labor as a pure variable cost 3 suggests that it was either easily managed or was
subject to other controls. 4 For these reasons, labor issues will
not be covered here.
This paper resurrects historical discussions of idle capacity.
The objective is twofold, first to demonstrate the sophistication
and innovation of early writers emphasizing why they thought
the topic important, and second to explore some theories about
why this interest dissipated within the accounting literature.
This research ends in the 1960s, by which time idle capacity as
an independent topic has largely disappeared.
This paper is divided into five sections. The first describes
broadly why idle capacity was important to early cost accountants and, briefly, why it lost its importance. The second reviews
a variety of writings on the subject from 1900 through 1960. The
third presents evidence of the disappearance of the subject from
the literature. The fourth examines reasons why the subject disappeared. The fifth is the conclusion.

2
Labor variances are found throughout the literature. However, these presentations are not accompanied by lengthy discussions about the importance of
the issue beyond the technical aspects of accounting.
3
A few writers suggest situations where some labor costs might be recorded
as fixed rather than variable (Alden 1924). One instance would be when highly
skilled workers are retained despite lack of work in order to preserve their skills
for the firm. The other possibility is to record as fixed, the wages of the minim u m personnel needed to operate.
4
The few references to idle labor in the cost literature treat it casually by
remarking that "labor can be discharged or put on fewer hours when output
declines" (Dohr, Inghram and Love 1935). Fiske (1931, 355) said that "losses
arising from idle labor are less significant than those arising from idle plant
since in most cases labor costs are at least partially controllable through layoff."
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INTRODUCTION
The cost literature contains many references to and articles
about factory and machine capacity through the 1950s. While
overhead in general was always the literature's dominant topic,
the particular interest in idle capacity was a consequence of
substantial investments in plant and machinery and the influence of the industrial engineer. The early decades of the century
were ones in which the engineer and the cost accountant focused on the productive or operational efficiency of the plant.
The beginning of the century witnessed an explosion of
machinery in manufacturing and a fascination on the part of
society as a whole with science, efficiency and standardization
(Chase, 1929a & b; Boorstin, 1973). Accompanying the heavy
capital investments in plant and machinery was a rise in mass
production techniques best symbolized by Henry Ford's automotive operations (Garner, 1976). 5
Mass production was both a result of the capabilities of
machines and a reaction to them. "The large investment in the
machinery and equipment of an industrial plant necessitates
getting the utmost use out of this equipment. Proper planning
. . . and regulation . . . constitute one of the greatest problems in
industrial management" (Jordan and Harris, 1920, p. 402). "After all, the measurement of a business is not its capitalization or
the magnitude of its physical equipment, but the net return on
the capital employed" (Peden, 1924, p. 121). Large capital
investments seemed to mandate mass production and a drive to
make that production efficient.
To meet the needs of this newly developing industrial society, a new kind of engineer evolved. Mechanical engineers began
to discuss efficiency at the end of the 19th century — how to
measure it and how to increase it. Interested in the efficiency of
the production process and the maximization of the output of
both people and machines, these engineers were the genesis of
what was later called the Scientific Management movement. 6
5

See particularly extensive quotes by Alfred Sloan regarding the necessity of
mass production at Ford Motor and Hyatt Roller Bearing Company in Garner
(1976,210-212)
6
The term, Scientific Management, was coined by Louis Brandeis who popularized it when he testified in 1910 against the request for rate increases by the
eastern railroads in front of the Interstate Commerce Commission. He claimed
(having read Frederick Taylor's works) that the railroads were poorly managed
and that if they were more scientifically managed they would profit more than
by increasing their rates (Boorstin 1974).
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Their descendants are today's industrial engineers. Their interest in efficient production processes linked up early with cost
accounting. It is from their work that time studies, standardization and wage incentive plans derived—all methods employed
to increase efficiency. Many of them contributed heavily to the
cost literature.
The depressions of 1920-1921 and the 1930s brought into
stark relief the devastation of deep undercapacity usage. Factory
and machinery were large investments that could not be laid off
or ignored. Under these conditions, thoughtful accountants and
engineers warned that failure to understand and communicate
the implications of undercapacity usage would lead to dysfunctional decisions.
In a period of declining output the manufacturer is likely to conclude that selling prices must be increased in
order to cover the increased costs whereas an increase
in selling prices leads only to further decline in demand
and in output (Dohr et al., 422, p. 1935).
In later decades, although references to capacity and efficiency issues appear periodically in the literature, there was a
clear decline. One reason for this was a shift in emphasis from
the production function to the sales function. It became more
important to anticipate sales and plan production to meet sales
requirements than it was to measure whether machinery was
producing as efficiently as possible. Identifying the reasons for
this shift is one of the purposes of this work. Major upheavals in
the economy, the great depression and World War II, certainly
contributed. Another appears to have been the emergence of
income m e a s u r e m e n t , dominated by financial accounting's
matching principle. The matching principle helped to move the
definition of efficiency away from the capacity of factory and
machine to how closely production could be tied to sales. The
cost accounting system was no longer used to identify the
underutilization of facilities.
ACCOUNTING FOR IDLE TIME
Operational

Efficiency

Early in the century, Alexander H. Church (1901), an engineer, published a series of articles describing a method of accounting for factory overhead costs. His influential but controversial ideas included isolating the cost of idle machinery.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol23/iss1/3
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Although others also tackled the idle time problem, his work is
particularly memorable. His contemporaries cited, argued about
and praised his prolific writings for three decades and his work
is still remembered. 7
Critical of the common practice of applying overhead using
a single, factory-wide rate, he insisted that multiple rates were
needed in order to generate useful information. He proposed
that the factory be divided into 'tiny shops'—small work areas or
work benches—departments usually composed of a single machine operated by one man. Overhead costs were to be carefully
apportioned among these tiny shops and then applied to products using a machine hour rate calculated for each individual
shop.
In the denominator of the application rate was the normal
number of hours the machine should be used. 'Normal' hours
were those during which the machine could operate less an allowance for usual downtime such as repairs. If the machine
were idle, the overhead for those hours would be entered into an
idle time account. Church (1901) said that the sum of the dollars
spent to maintain capacity was analogous to water dripping—
dripping from as many faucets as there were tiny shops. Either
the water dripped into a job or it dripped into a pool of waste.
Fixed costs, already sunk into the factory, could only be recovered through useful production. Idle time, therefore, was money
lost and its segregation would show m a n a g e m e n t just how
expensive operational inefficiency was.
Church was not alone in his concerns. Gantt (1917, 370),
a n o t h e r engineer, wrote t h a t "the expense of m a i n t a i n i n g
machinery in idleness is far greater than most people realize . . .
and all who wish to operate efficiently will begin at once to see
how it may be minimized." Harrison (1919, 443), a cost accountant, in a critique of contemporary cost accounting wrote:
Cost systems do not show the cost of non-production
but ingeniously saddle the machine which works with
the cost of the machine which is idle . . . (T)he merging
of the cost of idleness with the cost of production absolutely kills the value of cost statements considered as
indices of operating efficiency.

7

Richard Vangermeersch's work on Alexander Church, engineer and accountant, is important to those interested in the development of cost accounting in
the first third of this century—see bibliography.
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He predicted that engineers would take over cost accounting unless cost accountants improved their information producing capabilities. Engineers and accountants in the literature
agreed that managing facilities in order to maximize the productive output of machines was of prime importance. The question
was how the cost system could highlight areas of inefficiency.
Although the answer did not always come exclusively from formal accounting records, the primary source of information was
over- or underapplied overhead as measured in each department. However, this measured efficiency only if the denominator volume of the overhead rate calculation was carefully calculated.
Normal

Capacity

To separate productive hours from idle hours most authors,
including Church (1901) and Jordan and Harris (1920), used
'normal capacity.' 8 The term itself, 'normal capacity,' was not
applied universally so a reader must read texts closely to discover how each author defined the denominator volume. Nevertheless, most described a production-linked denominator which
was commonly called 'normal capacity.' Normal capacity was
the number of hours machinery should be operating (usually
reduced by an allowance for average downtime). It was to remain stable over a period of years so that costs could be meaningfully compared over time. (Normal could also be applied to
labor hours if machine rates were not used.)
The 1921 NACA-Yearbook contains the papers and discussions of a conference devoted largely to the subject of overhead
distribution under abnormal conditions (the 1920-21 depression). The participants discussed terminology at some length.
What is a normal overhead rate? Is a rate which during
a period of normal production and normal expense will
absorb all the overhead expense of that period...The
most difficult thing to determine will be the normal
volume of production. Normal production does not
mean possible production (Williams, 1921, p. 203).

8

The literature implies that most companies did want to use a predetermined overhead rate as opposed to waiting until the end of the year to gather
actual overhead costs and apply them at that point. No doubt some companies
did wait for actual costs but the literature reflects a clear preference for anticipated costs.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol23/iss1/3

6

counting for idle capacity: Its place in the historical cost literature and conjecture about its di
Vollmers: Accounting for Idle Capacity

31

One essential element has been neglected in developing
this normal rate . . . In predetermining a burden or expense rate to be applied to costs, a sufficient period
should be reviewed to include a cycle of both good and
bad business years (Merrifield, 1921, p. 212)
Using normal capacity to allocate overhead would produce
idle time losses if machinery were underutilized. It could also
generate an over-capacity gain but such an occurrence was
rarely considered in the literature. Clapp (1921, p. 223) said that
a cost system that did not measure idle time failed to provide
critical information about the efficiency of production. Normal
rates were needed to "to supply information to the executive
department to enable it to gauge the operations of the factory."
The participants finally voted on a definition.
'Normal capacity basis' is the total possible time (that
means any kind of work, machine or other), less reasonable allowance for break-downs, repairs, inefficiency, reasonable lack of operators, and all other regular normal delays outside of lack of orders to run on
(NACA-Yearbook, 1921, p. 241).
The definition was based on productive output. 9 Anticipated
sales volume did not enter into overhead rate because managing
the equipment in order to coax as m u c h production out of it as
possible had nothing to do with the availability of or lack of
sales. Most important, since overhead costs were applied at the
departmental level, productive inefficiencies could be identified
at a micro level.
The definition of what constituted a 'department' in the cost
literature was unique. Briefly, a department was a machine or
group of similar machines that produced a single product (or
similar group of products) under the supervision of a single
manager (Lawrence, 1925, p. 24-25; Dohr, Inghram and Love,
1935, p. 66; Blocker, 1950, p. 22). The numerator of the overhead rate was calculated for each department. Direct overhead
costs (e.g. departmental depreciation) were included as well as
joint overhead costs that had been allocated using a base that
had, if possible, a causal relationship to the costs (e.g. janitorial
costs based on square footage). Dividing this total by normal

9

Of the 11 people contributing articles or entering into the discussion, none
were academics—all were employed by companies as either accountants or engineers.

Published by eGrove, 1996

7

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 23 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 3
32

The Accounting Historians Journal, June 1996

capacity for the individual department produced a departmental
overhead rate. This permitted managers to observe the proportional demands on elements of overhead of different departments and product lines. In none of the texts or articles used for
this paper did any author recommend factory-wide overhead
application rates.
With unearned burden (idle time) eliminated, the unit
cost of lots produced may be fairly compared from one
period to another, and made the basis for a satisfactory
measure of the operating efficiency of the department.
These costs may also be compared with the standards
of efficiency which have been established, thereby giving a true conception of the value of the results obtained, regardless of any variation in the volume of
production. The actual expenses are compared with the
budget, and the actual production or operating time
compared with the standard, thus giving us two very
effective checks on the efficiency of each department
(Crockett, 1921, p. 218-219).
It is very significant that the definition of normal capacity
excluded sales. This productive or operational efficiency view of
costing emphasized the manufacturing function over the sales
or marketing function of a business. It was not until the 1930s
that one finds denominator volumes based on budgeted sales in
the cost literature. It was the change in the denominator volume
that signaled a movement away from measurement of productive efficiency.
Idle Time And Product Cost
Productive efficiency was not the only reason for tracking
idle time—determining product costs was another. Church
(1901) said that since the factory existed to produce goods, all
costs were product costs. The idle time charges generated by his
m e t h o d were reallocated over p r o d u c t i o n by m e a n s of a
supplementary rate. This would allow management to see, on a
full cost basis, how m u c h each good actually cost (Vangermeersch, 1986; Garner, 1976). This aspect of his method was
controversial because it resulted in dramatic changes in per unit
cost under volatile business conditions. Few viewed an idle time
loss as a product cost. Church (1930) later a b a n d o n e d the
supplementary rate and instead adopted, as did the majority of
other authors, the practice of expensing the idle time account as
a line item to profit and loss.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol23/iss1/3
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Jordan and Harris (1920) joined many writers concerned by
the effect on per unit cost of changes in factory capacity and in
the volume of production. 10 Production volume has a large effect
on per unit total cost if the fixed overhead rate is calculated
based on different yearly volume estimates or if the idle time of
a particular year is redistributed back over that year's production. In periods of high production, costs appear to decrease and
in periods of low production, costs appear to increase.
Concerned that these variations could be misunderstood
and lead to dysfunctional managerial choices, Jordan and Harris
(1920) and Clapp (1921) wanted to distinguish between idleness
due to manageable problems and those due to economic conditions. The use of a normal capacity denominator was the means
to this end. It stabilized the fixed overhead portion of product
cost over a period of years so that the unmanageable variations
in the economy were smoothed out and allowed managers to
make meaningful comparisons of costs from period to period.
According to Williams (1921, 210), the advantages of using
a normal rate included the ease with which management could
assign selling prices, calculate total cost per unit and avoid burd e n i n g m o n t h l y i n v e n t o r i e s w i t h excessive o v e r h e a d . He
doubted that managers could wisely interpret data that had not
been calculated using a normal rate:
The advantages of using a constant, normal, or average
overhead are largely psychological. (It) . . . does not
make costs lower, sell goods more quickly, or miraculously start factories working again. Such a policy, however, does permit the management to go ahead and figure their list prices and future profits without the
upsetting factor of this excessively high overhead staring them in the face in such a way as to disturb their
equilibrium and cause their reasoning faculties to become warped, because of the apparently panicky or impossible conditions confronting them (Williams, 1921,
p. 208).
Dohr et al. (1935) agreed with Williams (1921). Unit costs
inflated by idle time losses in times of low volume production
encouraged managers to raise prices—the worst possible policy
in periods of depression. Dohr et al. (1935) preferred to expense
underabsorbed overhead charges as idle capacity losses and
10

See Garner (1976) for a comprehensive discussion of early approaches to
idle time problems, from the end of the 19th century until 1925.
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overabsorbed charges as gains on intensive use. They viewed as
an abuse the practice of taking under- or overabsorbed overhead
amounts to a reserve account to smooth out profits.
Idle Time and Pricing
Although a cornerstone of classical economic theory is that
prices are determined by supply and demand, there are numerous references in the cost literature to the practice of setting
prices based on cost or, at a minimum, using cost information
as an input into the pricing decision (Williams, 1921; Clark,
1923; Lawrence, 1945; Clark, 1965 (1947 reprint); Devine, 1950;
Rushton, 1954). A 1963 NAA Research Report (#39) reported
that firms relied heavily on product costs for pricing purposes. 11
Many claimed that managers often based prices on the total unit
cost of a product (Jordan and Harris, 1920; Randleman, 1956).
Just recently I learned of a large producer of malleable
castings who quoted on an order for castings and who,
when told that his price was too high, explained that he
could make them at a lower price under normal conditions, but that at present his foundry was operating to
only 30% of capacity and therefore he must obtain a
higher price in order to avoid loss. He went so far as to
refuse the order at a price which he admitted would be
satisfactory if he were operating at normal capacity
(Williams, 1921, p. 201).
(Cost accounting) . . . offers great possibilities in the
way of developing a standard of sound or conservative
practice in fixing prices, which will act as a check on
cutthroat competition . . . And of course the critical
point is, after all, what the management does with the
figures after it gets them; what use it makes of them in
the actual fixing of prices (Clark, 1923, p. 14).
By using normal volume . . . we enable industry to
establish and maintain a sound price structure. This
will tend to eliminate cutthroat and ignorant competition . . . Normal burden rates should not include any
expense of inefficient operation of any nature, including equipment not required for the business. Otherwise,
such inefficiency may gradually force quotations beyond market possibilities (Downie, 1944, p. 7-8).
11

There is a substantial bibliography of articles on cost accounting and its
relationship to pricing decisions in this NAA study and in #24, "Product Costs
for Pricing Purposes" (August 1953).

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol23/iss1/3
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The value of a cost structure based on a measure of normal
capacity included keeping management attuned to a long-term
vision. This vision would encourage a reasonable approach to
product pricing. Prices over the long run had to cover all costs,
but there was general agreement that allowing prices to follow
short-term cost fluctuations was not only dangerous for the individual business but for whole industries as well.
Accounting

For Idle Time—Two

Presentations

Alden (1924, p. 115) illustrated how idle time was measured
and how those measurements were used in his company. Normal capacity was approximated at 80% of the possible production of individual, but related, machine groups. Each m o n t h
productive hours were gathered from job tickets. Some slack
time was added to cover repairs and waiting for tools and supplies. The percentage of productive hours to normal hours was
called the measure of degree of operation. The difference between the degree of operation and normal was the percentage of
idleness. The percentage of idleness was then applied to each
overhead item for each machine group and the sum of all of
these calculations was idle expense. For service departments, the
degree of idleness was figured on the basis of the factory as a
whole. The expenses of the service departments were allocated
to productive departments only after the idleness portion had
been subtracted and expensed.
Alden (1924, p. 120) explained that this procedure isolated
idle time losses at the departmental level. Foremen could see
where inefficiencies existed, how m u c h they cost and received
feedback on the measures taken in the past to increase efficiency. Additionally, because idle time charges were not included,
inventory values were conservatively stated. This simplified the
preparation of federal tax returns. The tax code required that
inventories be stated in accordance with the best accounting
practice and Alden (1924) and Cornell (1930) agreed t h a t
conservative valuations were representative of the best practice.
Additionally, creditors, who relied on inventory figures for their
lending decisions, benefitted from these lower valuations.
Fiske's (1931) analysis of idle time was comprehensive and
detailed. He divided its causes into three separate areas: productive, administrative and economic. Productive causes included
breakdowns and powerdowns. Administrative causes included
building a factory larger t h a n needed and retaining highly
skilled workers when not needed in order not to lose them.
Published by eGrove, 1996
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Economic causes included seasonal businesses, cyclical business
cycles and broad changes in demand that created conditions of
over- or under-capacity. He believed that management made
poor decisions when they were not aware of the varied causes of
idle time losses which were usually aggregated into a single
number.
The ultimate purpose of all accounting is to provide
management with the necessary facts upon which action may be taken to increase profits by decreasing expense, and to provide management with the basis for
evaluating the results produced by the various department heads . . . If management were interested in total
costs alone, there would be no need of keeping records
of cost of idle time since it could be included by neglect,
but if the management is interested in information as a
basis for control, it is necessary to accumulate information regarding the cost of idle time (Fiske 1931, p. 3601).
Fiske (1931) suggested that idle time losses caused by normal seasonal idleness be charged to the product while those
attributable to excess capacity arising from equipment purchased for future use be currently expensed. As for other causes
of idle time, he was not concerned with technical accounting per
se, but with using accounting to illuminate the sources and
causes of idleness. He recommended keeping statistical records
separate from the ledger to track the various causes of idle time
losses and to assess responsibility where possible.
Idle Time and Supplementary

Records

Brummet (1957, p. 11) criticized the early advocates of
tracking idle time from 1890-1930 for believing that one cost
measurement would suffice for all purposes. However, there is
evidence that at least some writers during that period recognized that supplementary information was needed.
Jordan and Harris (1920), in their cost textbook, reported
that managers failed to get the most out of their equipment
because information about problems was not timely. 12 They suggested that multicolored cards representing the status of each
piece of equipment be placed on a dispatch board to flag those

12

An entire chapter of their book is devoted to the problem of idle machin-

ery.
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responsible for keeping the machines running. 1 3 Feedback was
important so cumulative reports should be kept for each machine showing productive and nonproductive hours and the reasons why the machines had been idle. "This report reflects every
week the running conditions of the equipment and shows up
both successes and failures of the effort to eliminate idle time of
equipment" (417).
Sanders (1923, p. 17) said that the cost department should
produce a variety of useful data. Some " . . . control records need
to be expressed in terms of money, and incorporated in the
accounting system . . . (other needs) . . . may be adequately
served by keeping only quantitative statistics, such as quantity
of materials used, amount of time taken on operations, quantity
of goods produced and the like."
Randleman (1956) also recognized the necessity of supplementary information. He discussed the differential information
arising from the use of alternate definitions of normal capacity.
One, average capacity, was based on expected future sales over a
period of years. The other, practical capacity, was the volume at
which the plant was equipped to operate or the m a x i m u m
capacity attainable (the later has often been called 'theoretical
capacity'). 14 Each had advantages and disadvantages. Average
capacity produced higher unit costs and hid idle capacity losses
but was preferred for long-term pricing decisions. Practical capacity highlighted idle capacity, providing information for control purposes, but was misleading for pricing decisions.
Randleman (1956) said that no single method of assigning
costs to inventory could fulfil all needs—additional statistical
records were necessary. These records would include: estimates
of average commercial demand, factory capacity that will remain unused in meeting average commercial demand, expected
long-term product costs, a long-range predetermined price setting policy, schedules of production levels and employment levels. All of these cost records would provide realistic short-term
product costs, reveal the inefficient use of facilities through the
analysis of unabsorbed burden, and state inventories and profits
at conservative levels. Vance's (1958) textbook also recom13

The primary causes of idleness were: no operator, no material, no orders,
machine breakdown or under repair, no power, waiting for set-up, waiting for
tools and waiting for instructions (Jordan and Harris 1920, 406).
14
Note that when Randleman (1956) calls the 'volume at which the plant was
equipped to operate,' 'practical capacity,' the use of that term is similar to the
earlier usage of the term normal capacity.'

Published by eGrove, 1996

13

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 23 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 3

mended that statistical records be kept to illuminate idle machinery.
Churchill (1958) echoed Randleman (1956). Management
needed a variety of information to meet different decision needs.
He did not recommend any single method of accounting because the choice of denominator volume and whether idle capacity costs were charged to inventory or to the period was not
as important as understanding and analyzing the information
embodied in the costs. "Data in which too m u c h has been
merged will be meaningless . . . the proper determination of the
costs attributable to idle capacity is important" (Churchill, 1958,
p. 87).
From the beginning of the century, until approximately
1960, there was a strong interest in operational efficiency, and
in how cost accounting, by highlighting facilities usage, could
contribute to these efficiencies. Many recognized that accounting methods could lead to dysfunctional decisions. At the same
time, some practitioners and academics warned that the use of
any single measure was insufficient for management needs.
IDLE CAPACITY MEASUREMENT BEGINS TO DISSIPATE
New ideas in cost and financial accounting were developing
in parallel with these older notions of operational efficiency and
were soon to come to prominence. Idle capacity measurement, a
function of engineering or productive efficiency, began to disappear when financial accounting began to measure sales or marketing efficiency. This is not meant to be an absolute statement.
Interest in capacity never completely disappeared and much of
the modern cost literature, including The Goal (Goldratt and
Cox, 1984) and The Profit Potential (McNair, 1994) explore capacity issues in detail. However, the 1963 NAA Research Study
#39 showed that while capacity continued to interest the NAA,
few of the surveyed firms at that time tracked idle capacity in
their books. Formal measurement of idle capacity had largely
disappeared. In its place were measures of sales or selling capacity and income measurement.
Earlier, a NACA research study (Bulletin, 4/1/38, p. 925) surveyed the overhead practices of its members. The definition of
'normal' had already changed since the 1921 vote. 'Normal capacity' in this 1938 study usually meant (bearing in mind that
the study found much variety in terminology) "the expected utilization of the plant over a period of years in the future, taking
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol23/iss1/3
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into consideration both expected sales for the period and the
capacity available." Of 194 firms that reported using normal
capacity, only 39 based it solely on the ability to produce while
138 considered both the ability to produce and sell.
This survey marks a major break in the presentation of capacity themes in the literature. There had been movement away
from an engineering-oriented view of 'normal' toward a marketing or sales-orientation. The implications of this shift are profound. If budgeted production based on expected sales volume is
used in the denominator of the overhead rate, then the volume
variance does not measure operational efficiency. It measures
whether production did or did not exceed a budget and not the
extent to which machines and factory were productive.
Of the 224 firms surveyed, 69 isolated fixed charges on idle
plant and equipment from overhead and 55 of those charged
that amount to profit and loss. That is to say, fixed charges on
completely idle assets were not added into the overhead rate
calculation. It was implied that partial idleness was not considered. Of the 90 companies that did accumulate idle charges arising from underused capacity, only 26 of them expensed them as
a line item—the remainder charged them back to cost of goods
sold—precisely the choice that earlier writers had condemned as
misleading.
DeCoster (1966) recognized this change in orientation. He
argued that contemporary accounting literature was confused
about idle capacity losses saying that most authors of articles
and texts mistook the variance generated by the difference between actual and expected sales as a measurement of productive
efficiency. That is, while the terminology of productive efficiency, that of idle capacity, had survived, the computed variance
was not measuring it.
Evidence supporting DeCoster's (1966) observation can be
found in two articles by Horngren (1967, 1969). He analyzed the
capacity variance that was then commonly computed. The variance, expected idle capacity, was calculated as the difference
between possible production and estimated sales. Other variances included in the articles included: budgeted sales less actual sales, budgeted sales less sales orders received and sales
orders received less actual sales. The older measurement of idle
capacity—the difference between normal and actual production—never appeared. In fact, his definition of 'normal' was "the
rate of activity needed to meet average sales demand over a
period long enough to encompass seasonal and cyclical fluctuaPublished by eGrove, 1996
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tions" (255). Horngren (1967, p. 260) maintained that information about idle facilities was needed "at the master budget
planning stage, not the evaluation of performance stage." He
ignored the informational value of interim capacity changes.
None of his variances provided information about capacity opportunities. Analysis of capacity, an operational measure, bowed
to sales measures.
The final evidence that change occurred lies in modern cost
textbooks. The majority of these texts use annual budgeted
p r o d u c t i o n g e n e r a t e d from a n n u a l expected sales in t h e
denominator of the overhead rate calculation (Usry and Hammer, 1991; Barfield, Raiborn and Kinney, 1994). "Under a normal cost system . . . The rate is developed by predicting total
overhead costs for the coming year and dividing them by the
predicted total activity for the coming year" (Morse and Roth,
1986, p. 69) The same definition appears in Moriarty and Allen
(1991, p. 581) and in Horngren, Foster and Datar (1994, p. 537).
While many of these books touch on alternative capacity measures and spend a page or two on capacity problems in general,
in no way could the discussions be viewed as comprehensive.
This contrasts, for example, with 20 pages of text in Dohr,
Inghram and Love (1935) and a full chapter on the subject in
Jordan and Harris (1920). The overhead rate used throughout
each modern text is based on a yearly budgeted n u m b e r and
linked to income measurement. Because the rate changes with
different annual budget expectations, product costs cannot be
compared from year to year. For the same reason, no variance
provides information on capacity usage.
It is impossible to pinpoint this change in focus since it was
clearly evolutionary but this work attempts to trace some of the
paths leaving to others the opportunity to research them further.
At this point then, we return to the past to search for sources of
these changes and to suggest reasons for them.
THE SHIFT TO SALES EFFICIENCY—
A TENTATIVE EXPLORATION
The Great Depression
What factors may account for the shift from operational to
sales efficiency? During the depression of the 1930s, companies
operated well under capacity for many years. Tracking idle capacity may have become superfluous. It was far more important
to search for sales opportunities.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol23/iss1/3
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Fligstein (1990) noted this transformation although his research interest was in methods of corporate control, not accounting. He distinguished between the manufacturing and the
sales and marketing conceptions of control exercised by large
firms. The manufacturing conception (operational efficiency)
was one corporate response to competition.
(M)anagers embraced tactics to promote price stability.
(They) viewed stable pricing as attainable through attention to the production process. This caused them to
focus on what they could control as a counterthreat: the
flow of goods through the production process (117).
In contrast, managers at other firms began early in the
1920s to compete by searching for new markets, by differentiating their products, by advertising and establishing b r a n d
names rather than by controlling production and prices. His
thesis was that the firms that embraced the manufacturing
conception did poorly, as a whole, during the depression while
those that had shifted to a sales and marketing conception survived. While Fligstein (1990) looked primarily at competitive
forces and the drive to eliminate or minimize competition, his
ideas appear to be reflected in this cost literature. Accounting
for efficiency might disappear if economic conditions made productive efficiency irrelevant. That is, if products cannot be sold,
there is little purpose in measuring whether machinery had
been utilized to its fullest capabilities.
A related factor that deserves extended study was the influence of trade associations. Under New Deal regulations, a trade
associations was allowed to gather costing information from
firms in its industry and establish industry-wide m i n i m u m product costs. These minimums became floors below which firms in
that industry could not reduce prices. The purpose was to eliminate cutthroat competition and thereby minimize bankruptcies.
Although not particularly successful, there may have been longterm effects on cost structure (Galambos, 1966). Given this legal
authority, there was an incentive to set product costs high
enough to include idle capacity losses in order to ensure profit. 15
Also, if costs were set industry-wide, the incentive to continue to
measure costs carefully was removed.
15

One can also imagine the incentive going the other direction. If the trade
associations were dominated by the larger firms in an industry, they might want
to set minimum costs low so that they could continue to charge low prices and
force competitors out of business.
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Regulation

It is highly conjectural to draw conclusions about the longterm effects of World War II regulations on cost accounting.
However, it would not be appropriate to ignore possible effects
for lack of solid evidence for there may well be links to the
capacity issue. For the larger firm (and it is from relatively large
firms that most of the contributions to the cost literature arise),
the acquisition of government contracts m e a n t the end of
undercapacity for a sustained period of time. The government
wanted output quickly no matter the cost.
Most government contracts were on a cost plus a fixed fee
basis. Nonreimbursable costs were spelled out. One of these was
"expenses, maintenance, and depreciation of excess facilities vacated or abandoned, or not adaptable for future use in performing contract or subcontracts (including idle land and building,
idle parts of a building and excess machinery and equipment)"
(Miller, 1942, p. 98). It was not necessary to track and exclude
the idle capacity costs of active facilities. Reimbursement was
based on the contract, not the product, so the cost of individual
p r o d u c t s became irrelevant. With cost recovery and profit
guaranteed, there was little or no incentive to be cost efficient.
The issue is one of institutional memory. Did firms that operated with war contracts for many years return to measuring idle
capacity after the war or was this measurement forgotten?
Income Measurement—Direct

Costing

Direct costing was first introduced in the 1930s. From two
articles in the NACA-Bulletin in the 1930s to over 40 in the
1950s, it became a major topic in the accounting literature. Direct costing treats all fixed overhead costs as period expenses,
not as costs of inventory. The logic of marginal revenue or
contribution margin analysis (unit sales price less unit direct
cost) impressed many. Today it is covered in virtually all cost
and managerial textbooks as a decision tool, but, at that time,
many wanted to use it for inventory valuation as well.
The 1953 NAA Research Series #23 on direct costing discovered only 18 companies using this method in their financial
records and both the Internal Revenue Service and professional
accounting bodies were opposed to it on theoretical grounds.
The 1957 revision of the 1948 "Accounting Concepts and Stand a r d s Underlying Corporate Financial S t a t e m e n t s " by the
American Accounting Association said that omitting any elehttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol23/iss1/3
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ment of manufacturing cost from a product was unacceptable
(539). Mssrs Hill and Vatter, in that publication, dissented from
the majority view saying that direct costing was acceptable and
"will, in many cases, yield results more useful to investors as
well as to management" (545). For the purposes of this study,
the important point is that while the information arising from a
direct cost system is useful, it does not generate any data on idle
capacity. Idle capacity was not an issue in that literature and
that literature was pervasive for a long time. While direct costing was being discussed, productive efficiency was not.
Income Measurement—the

Matching

Principle

Perhaps the most important trend was the increasing interest in the calculation of financial accounting income for reporting purposes. Prior to approximately 1938-1940, the balance
sheet was not only the predominant published financial statement, it was often the only financial statement. The components
of income, such as 'Sales' and 'Cost of Sales,' had long been
considered proprietary. 16 Rather than an income statement there
might have been a single line, called 'earnings,' or, perhaps
'earnings before depreciation,' 'depreciation' and 'net earnings.'
Often there was no reference to income at all.
The Securities and Exchange Commission began to insist
on sales and cost of sales disclosures and, despite the reservations of the business community and the accounting profession,
income measurement quickly commanded attention. Theories of
income measurement took on increased importance. Soon, one
theory came to dominance in the financial community and it
governed accounting for cost of goods sold and the valuation of
ending inventory. It was the matching principle.
Paton and Littleton's classic monograph, An Introduction of
Corporate Accounting Standards (1940), m a d e the matching
principle, which linked economic benefits with economic sacri16
A 1935 JOA editorial shows the profession's antipathy to disclosure. The
following is in reference to new SEC requirements.
Here it is provided that the profit and loss statement shall disclose the
amount of gross sales, cost of sales and gross profits...If we were to have
a full disclosure of every item of the accounts of a corporation engaged
in competitive endeavor there soon would be no competition...(They
object to the disclosure of confidential information because) it would be
detrimental to the interest of investors and therefore contrary to the
purpose of the law; and the information itself might be misleading (162163).
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fices, preeminent. Sales were to be matched with the costs incurred to produce them. In order to match production with
sales, the denominator volume of the overhead rate had to be
based on sales. This matching process precluded any measurement of idle capacity. Horngren's (1967, 1969) articles cited
earlier are excellent examples of financial accounting's adoption
of the matching principle.
Ferrara (1960, 1961a&b) took the matching principle to the
extreme. He argued that there was no such thing as an idle
capacity loss for income measurement purposes. He proposed a
unit of production method for allocating fixed costs, one that
could not generate an idle capacity variance. He focused on
financial income measurement—not on the operational needs of
the firm. Ferrara wanted to match economic benefits (sales)
with economic sacrifices (production costs) in order to produce
the most theoretically correct measurement of income.
Weinwurm (1961) responded heatedly to Ferrara (1961b).
He argued that accounting had a duty to provide information,
information that included data on capacity usage. Allowing
theories of income measurement to dominate risked damaging
company operations. Despite Weinwurm's arguments, income
measurement played an increasingly large role in financial accounting and had a substantial influence on cost accounting.
This focus on income measurement had consequences. If
idle capacity were not measured, it may well have been ignored.
Indeed, there is virtually no literature on idle capacity after this
until decades later. Just as Brummet (1957) accused early writers of ignoring different costs for different purposes, so too can
those of the 1960s be accused—they were interested in income
measurement to the exclusion of other accounting purposes.
While supplementary records outside of the formal accounting
records could provide information on capacity usage, the silence
of the literature suggests that the topic was no longer of interest
and that firms were not measuring it.
The Disappearance of the Engineer
The final component of the diminishing interest in operational efficiency may have been the gradual withdrawal of the
industrial engineer from cost accounting venues. From 1900 1930, engineers maintained a presence in cost accounting. There
was a substantial amount of contact among engineers and cost
a c c o u n t a n t s interested in d i s s e m i n a t i n g cost i n f o r m a t i o n
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol23/iss1/3
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through conferences and articles. Many cost textbooks were coauthored with engineers and engineers contributed regularly to
the NACA-Bulletin and other publications of the National Association of Cost Accountants.
The engineering contribution to the NACA-Bulletin declined
from 20% in the 1920s to 13% in the 1930s and 7% in the
1940s. 17 Vangermeersch (1984) presented evidence of the decline
of engineers in costing without offering any explanation for that
decline. Armstrong (1985, p. 136) was interested in the power
relationships between the accounting, engineering and personnel professions within the corporation. He took the disappearance of the engineer as given and asserted that "accountants
displaced engineers because decisions of allocation between dissimilar operations could only be made on a common abstract—
and therefore financial—basis." He contended that since management responds most strongly to financial information, in the
long-term struggle for power, the accountant would displace the
engineer. With the accounting profession focused on income
measurement, and with their production-oriented colleagues
gone, it is not illogical that production-oriented measures would
fall by the wayside.
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper was, in part, to remember those
who measured operational efficiency earlier in the century. They
accomplished this by spotlighting the idle time of machines and
the idle capacity of the factory through a cost accounting system
linked to production. Beginning in the 1930s, although interest
in capacity never disappears entirely, there was a withdrawal
from this topic. It was replaced by sales or marketing efficiency
measures. Some of the possible reasons for this change were
presented for future research. They included: the great depression, during which idle capacity was so prevalent that it hardly
needed emphasis; the growth of trade associations which were
given incentives to set price minimums; war contracts which
reimbursed all costs and eliminated for many years the benefits
of tracking idle capacity; an increasing interest in income
measurement for financial accounting purposes which washed
over management accounting and its literature; and the disap17

This information was gathered by count. During these years, each article
in the NACA-Bulletin was preceded by a short biography of the author which
included his or her professional background.
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pearance of the engineer from cost accounting which removed
the party most interested in production.
Except for selected references, no attempt has been made to
study the capacity issue past the 1960s. By then, enough of a
transition had been made from operational to sales efficiency to
substantiate this major change. Much of the literature at that
t i m e was a p p e a r i n g in The Accounting
Review written by
academics. Whether this academic influence might also have
had a long-term effect on cost accounting practice is another
topic for research.
While idle capacity as an independent topic may not be
overwhelmingly appealing to many readers, this research finds
that it opens a window on periods of accounting history that
have been insufficiently studied, particularly the 1930s and
1940s. There was a major shift in the profession's understanding
of overhead costing and the purpose of its allocations. That shift
appears to have been generated by a variety of forces from
within and without the profession.
Losing idle capacity measurements meant that information
on machine usage and production opportunities as well as the
location of bottlenecks in the production process was lost. The
modern attention placed on minimizing non-value adding activities has revived interest in capacity issues. It is possible that
guidance on how to approach these problems might be found in
the solutions posed by early cost accountants and their peers,
the industrial engineers.
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